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MANAGING THE USER RELATIONSHIP IM INFORMATION
SYSTEMS DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS: A TRANSACTION
GOVERNANCE APPROACH
Cynthia Mathis Beath
Carlson School of Management
University of Minnesota
ABSTRACT
This paper compares the effectiveness of two mechanisms for governing the relationship
between an information systems development team and the new system's users. This relation-
ship is traditionally governed using phased commitments and user involvement. Drawing on
the organizational economics literature, the paper proposes a new view in which a project is
characterized as a transaction, or an exchange, between IS and the users. Two alternatives
for governing this exchange, one based on explicit, classical contracting and the other relying
more on implicit, social contracting, are hypothesized to be differentially effective in
governing exchanges of low or high difficulty, respectively. The model is explored in a field
study at a single site and found to be supported, indicating that more rigorous tests of the
model are warranted.
INTRODUCTION this multitude is usually condensed to a "virtual
user" who combines some of each characteristic;
Information systems (IS) development projects are a that is, he or she is high enough in the organiza-
way of life in MIS departments. On these projects, tion to influence the flow of resources and is also a
project teams composed principally of IS specialists knowledgeable participant in the business function
specify, develop (or obtain) and install an applica- to be supported. The term "user" is employed here
tion system for business users in other parts of the in the same sense.
same organization. There are many stresses and
strains in systems work, but the relationship In IS development projects, two things need to be
between the IS specialists and their organizational accomplished in the project/user relationship. First,
colleagues is one of the most problematic. Boehm to invest organizational resources wisely, the costs
(1981) notes that difficulties in this relationship can and features of the new system should be agreed
double the costs of a project. Since it is the users upon in advance. Second, the user must find value
who will ultimately pass judgement on the system, in the installed system. That is, it is not enough
and by extension, on the IS function, it would seem that the IS department delivers a system that
desirable to have a more satisfactory model for matches the specifications. It is also necessary that
understanding, and thus managing, the relationship the system be useful. The two principal mechanisms
between IS project teams and their user community. by which we seek to accomplish these goals are
This paper proposes and explores such a model. aspects of the systems development life cycle
(SDLC) and user involvement.
The major business users of information systems
include clerical personnel, first-level managers, staff An SDLC has many features which support the day-
specialists, and higher management (Davis 1974). In to-day activities of the project team. Its primary
the IS literature the term "user" frequently goes support for investment management, however, lies in
undefined, but it usually includes that person or a series of checkpoints at which proposed costs and
persons who (a) hold or control the resources being features of the system are reviewed by the users,
exchanged for the system (hence the term "client" providing them an opportunity to reconsider the
or "customer"), and (b) will provide or use data decision to invest in the system. Beginning with
f'rom the new system. In theory and in practice the initial project authorization, the SDLC takes the
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user and team through a series of agreements. approach based on social contracting, which rests
Increasingly specific documents detail the agreed on a foundation of user involvement.
upon costs and features of the new system. Change
control mechanisms record addenda to these A NEW PERSPECTIVE
agreements. Preference for this gradual and public
commitment to IS investments is strong in today's The organizational economics literature (Barney and
organizations. (The principal difficulty with proto- Ouchi 1986) considers the question of why organiza-
typing is that it threatens to violate this norm, and tions take one form or another. It focuses on
so prototyping is now seen as an alternative method transactions, or exchanges of resources, and asks,
of requirements elicitation (Zmud 1980) to be "Why are some exchanges carried out within the
carried out within an SDLC-type framework of organization and others outside?" The opinion of
gradual commitment.) this literature is that an exchange will require more
elaborate governance mechanisms if the exchange
triggers either or both of two human weaknesses--
User involvement is the other main mechanism used bounded rationality (small minds) and self-interest
by project teams to manage the user relationship. (hard hearts). Markets are considered to use the
While the efficacy of user involvement has been least elaborate governance mechanism (using a
difficult to demonstrate (Ives and Olson 1984), it is combination of prices, classic contracts and
believed to result in more accurate user require- competition), and clans the most elaborate (based on
ments (Powers and Dickson 1973) and to increase traditions, social agreements and a common world
the likelihood that the user will value the system view) (Ouchi 1980; Williamson 1975; Williamson and
(Swanson 1974; Markus 1983). User involvement is Ouchi 1981). More elaborate strategies, while more
thus an important supporting mechanism for the powerful, are more costly to establish and maintain.
agreements produced by the SDLC. That is, user Thus, to minimize governance costs, governance
involvement both improves the quality of the mechanisms should be matched to the uncertainty
agreements produced by the SDLC and strengthens and strategic opportunities in the exchange, which,
users' commitment to those agreements, increasing if ungoverned, will cause the exchange to fail or to
the likelihood that the user will use and favorably be concluded inefficiently.
evaluate the IT investment.
Why is this literature important in managing the
However, user involvement is difficult to implement. project/user relationship? First, consider that an
Users have their own jobs to do, and they are not internal systems development project implies an
specialists. User involvement, particularly by those exchange between IS and its user community. That
who are not clients, can muddle rational investment exchange must be governed to minimize the effects
control. Who should make which decision? How of bounded rationality and self-interest. This is
can user decisions be made visible? Who bears :he accomplished by exchanging information about the
consequences of user-initiated delays or overruns? costs and features of the system often enough to
Difficulty in resolving these issues discourages user monitor the correctness of the investment decision.
involvement. If the project is a simple one, this information
exchange can be concluded quite easily. If the
The IS literature acknowledges that gradual project is complex, more elaborate governance
commitment, based on specification of requirements, mechanisms are needed. Compared to the tradition-
is difficult in the face of complexity, uncertainty, al view of governing the project/user relationship,
lack of structure, time pressure, and so forth (see shown in Figure 1, this new view, summarized in
Beath 1983). A variety of alternative mechanisms Figure 2, is not radically different but does include
are suggested, but they have little theoretical basis some interesting additional implications.
and have not been widely accepted. This paper
draws from the organizational economics literature The sources of project difficulty in Figure 2 include
for some advice on what to do about those more not only the usual uncertainty and complexity issues
difficult projects. A model is proposed in which a (small minds issues, for the most part), but also
traditional SDLC-based approach is appropriate for considerations of previous and future exchanges
governing the project/user relationship in (hard hearts issues). Previous investments relevant
straightforward projects, as expected. More to the current exchange -- such as IS training in a
challenging projects, however, require a governance particular technology -- or ignorance of future
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Figure 1. How to Manage the Project/User Figure 2. How to Manage the Project/User
Relationship: The Traditional Relationship: The Transaction
View Governance View
payouts from the current exchange make design but mutually understood agreements, and the hard
choices, and thus project investment decisions, more hearts problems are dealt with by a sense of
problematic. For one thing, prior investment may personal obligation and commitment. Matrix
activate self-interest by creating sunk costs or governance involves shared responsibilities, more
small numbers bargaining situations. For another, a frequent checkpoints and contact with users, and
short term view is a disincentive for investing in social assessment of progress and outcomes, which
more elaborate governance. may continue beyond system installation.
The list of potential project/user governance
mechanisms could be quite lengthy, as any approach In the new view, the objective of a project/user
equal to the "small minds" and "hard hearts" governance mechanism broadens from "delivering all
problems of a particular project would qualify. features on time and on budget" to "providing
Market governance would be appropriate when information regarding the expected value of the
purchasing software from vendors. Clan governance project effectively and efficiently." The former
is perhaps appropriate for end-user computing. The goal is meaningful only when the quasi-market mode
SDLC approach to exchange governance discussed is in operation. Thinking more generally, the
above is equivalent to quasi-market governance. objective is to erect and maintain a way to share
Quasi-market governance is basically an internal information with the user so that investments in
market, in which prices and contracts are used to information technology will be made judiciously.
control small minds problems and the employment Enough information must be provided for both
relation controls hard heart problems. It includes parties to make good choices on a timely basis and
several classic contract notions: prespecification of at least cost. A proper match between project
acceptance criteria, infrequent checkpoints, characteristics and governance mechanism results in
measurement of progress and costs by comparison to the proper generation of information needed to
written, explicit agreements. Another possible govern the investment decision. A mismatch, on
governance approach is matrix governance (Beath the other hand, will be costly, generating either
1983). Matrix governance is based on social insufficient or irrelevant information. Figure 3
contracting notions, in which the small minds summarizes this contingency relationship.
problems are dealt with in implicit, weakly specified
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Governance mechanism Quasi-market (Not effective -Successfulbased on (Not effective -- , governance mechanism insufficient information) (Controlled progress,
classic contracts insullicient information) good trade-offs)
Unsuccessful Unsuccessful
Governance mechanism Matrix Successful
based on ' (Too expensive --
Successlul S governance mechanism
(Cor,trolled progress, irrelevant information)
(Too expensive -
social contracts irrelevant information) good trade-oils)
Low High
Figure 3. A General Model for Managing Figure 4. An Exploratory Model for Managing
the User Relationship the User Relationship
The general argument is that while low difficulty support of a full range of business functions. Of
projects are amenable to governance with classic the fourteen projects, four were selected for in-
contracting approaches embedded in the SDLC, more depth examination and exploration of the model.
difficult projects require an approach which matches
difficulty in specification to a set of acceptable This paper uses those four cases to explore three
social contracts. That is, the SDLC approach may questions: 1) Is proper matching of governance
be a good way to govern some projects. Another mechanism to project difficulty necessary for effec-
way, matrix governance, relies on user involvement tive governance of the project/user relationship? 2)
to provide a foundation for hammering out social Can difficult projects be effectively managed with
contracts and is better for the tough projects. It matrix governance? 3) What are the consequences
seems likely that some IS project managers sense of a mismatch? The case study approach is
this and behave accordingly. Hence, references are particularly appropriate in this situation, as the
made to matrix-type techniques in the IS literature phenomena of interest are quite complex, difficult
(Beath 1983), and we might expect to find IS to remove from the work context and occur in small
project managers using matrix governance tech- numbers, and the model being explored is still in
niques, but without a framework which legitimatizes the inductive stage. The objectives of the research
them or focuses them appropriately. The model are to enrich the model and to determine whether
proposed here attempts to rectify this situation. to pursue testing it using more costly methods.
THE STUDY The information systems organization of ORM is
typical of many systems development departments in
In the expectation that some IS project managers large corporations. The operating environment is
were already using matrix approaches, a field study IBM and IBM-compatible; COBOL is the principal
was conducted to explore a reduced version of the application system language. IS reports to the
model in Figure 3 (Beath 1986). The governance financial vice president, and the systems develop-
mechanisms of interest in this initial exploration ment group's functional organization mirrors ORM's
were quasi-market and matrix; the project charac- organization. At the time of the study, develop-
teristics of interest were project size and uncer- ment projects were measured on schedule and cost
tainty. Thus, the exploratory model (Figure 4) is performance, with schedule performance receiving
more limited than the general model. The field the most attention.
study examined fourteen recent projects at an oil
refining and marketing company, called ORM here, Policies on governance of the project/user relation-
using both quantitative and qualitative techniques. ship at ORM could be characterized as laissez-faire
The projects were typical MIS applications, in many respects. Project authorizations were
emphasizing development of online applications in required for development projects requiring more
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than six months to complete, but some authoriza- nological complexity and social complexity were
tions were signed just prior to completion. Systems computed. Size included measures of the number of
development standards were embodied in SDM/70 work months, the elapsed time, and the number and
(SDM/70 no date), a purchased set of forms and size of subsystems to be developed. Technical
methods espousing the typical SDLC or quasi-market complexity included consideration of mode (batch or
approach to governance of the project/user reta- online), degree of distribution of process or data,
tionship. But project managers were given the and the number of computers and peripherals
discretion to use SDM/70 as they saw fit; typically involved in the system. Socia/ complexity included
they searched the material for methods, forms and measures of the severity of procedural changes
techniques they felt would be useful on a particular required in the user area, the number of users, the
project. No policy governed user involvement on newness of the technology to the user, the attitude
the projects studied. User liaisons were frequently of the user towards computing and the commitment
designated on projects, but the responsibilities of of the user management to the new system.
user liaisons varied considerably. All project
managers were IS professionals. All fourteen projects were officially on time,
reflecting, no doubt, the emphasis on schedule
performance; budget variance ranged from +13% to
Overall, it appears that at ORM, as in many similar - 12%. To measure the adequacy with which the
IS departments, project management is considered project/user relationship was managed on these
an art, not a discipline. Deviations from strict projects, ORM's six systems and programming
SDLC norms are tolerated at ORM, especially in the managers were asked to rate each project on six
blurring of phases, informal accommodation of attributes. Among these were two attributes
changes, and manipulation of budget and schedule relating to the objectives of the project/user
records. Thus, it was expected that some projects governance mechanisms: (1) display controlled
at ORM might use a project/user governance progress -- throughout the project, the status of
mechanism that deviated from the usual quasi- the project schedule, budget and features to be
market approach, incorporating or substituting delivered are communicated clearly to all stake-
matrix mechanisms. holders and (2) make good tradeoff choices--
between cost, schedule and requirements, par-
Project/user relationship governance on the fourteen ticularly with respect to technical issues of design,
projects in the study was evaluated using interviews development and implementation. Recall that the
with project managers and reviews of project objective of the project/user governance mechanism
documents. Key indicators of social contracting at is to exchange cost and benefit information so that
ORM were reliance on social assessments for appropriate tradeoff decisions can be made.
progress and completion, the extension of service
beyond phase termination date, and delays in Of the fourteen projects initially examined, four
signing project authorizations. Particular attention were selected for comparative examination of the
was also paid to user involvement as an important exploratory model. The projects were selected to
supporting mechanism for social contracting. Key represent a variety of relationships between
discriminators of user involvement at ORM were the outcomes, governance mechanism and project
degree of responsibility for project activities taken difficulty. Two "successful" projects (rated second
by the user, inclusion of project involvement in and third by the managers) and two "unsuccessful"
user's performance reviews, and the "earliness" of projects (rated twelfth and thirteenth) were se-
user involvement (late involvement does not provide lected. (Documentation on the best and worst
a foundation for agreements). projects was much more limited.) The two successful
projects appeared to be examples of appropriate
uses of quasi-market and matrix governance,
Among the fourteen projects examined the typical respectively, and they are called Good-Q and Good-
project lasted about fifteen months, and cost about M, below. The two unsuccessful projects, called
$600,000. Indications of project relative size and Bad-Q (apparently quasi-market governance) and
uncertainty were drawn from the project's risk Bad-? (apparently no governance) provided an
analysis, a form completed at the beginning of each opportunity to explore the limits of the model.
project similar to one described by McFarlan (1981; Figure 5 indicates where the four cases fit into the
Dallas Tire Case 1980). Measures of size, tech- model.
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Project Size and Uncertainty system (merely reading a file), is logically straight-
forward, uses familiar, established technology, andLow High
is not critical to normal business activities. Retail
Marketing, the client, was the only "user," and the
Good-Q Bad-Q new system required neither structural changes toQuasi-market
governanco mechanism {Expidid outcome: (Exp clid outcome: the organization nor significant changes to daily
SucceutuD Unsuccesslul) operations. "Overall the Risk Analysis did give the
total project a low risk rating, which proved to be
Matrix ( Good-M accurate," says the PCR.
governance mechanism
(Expected outcome: (Expeaed outcome:
Unsuccesstul) Successtul) Quasi-market Governance. Nancy, the project
manager for Good-Q, is quite familiar with standard
system development techniques, and relies on them.
No governance mechanism "Good-Q followed the SDM/70 project life cycleBad-?
(Expected outcome: Unsuccessful} methodology and guidelines," says the PCR.
Following SDM guidelines, user involvement in the
project emphasized information sharing, not
responsibility for project tasks. Relevant marketing
Figure 5. Summary of Case Results and accounting personnel were interviewed in the
requirements phase. Later these same individuals
reviewed a specification document describing the
Case descriptions of the four projects were proposed system. A user liaison reviewed results of
developed from previously obtained material and the acceptance test.
supplemented by additional interviews with project
personnel and other observers and by examination Two project authorizations were signed for this
of project documents, such as project documentation project, both in a timely fashion. The first was
and Project Closing Reports (PCR's). The four signed quite near the beginning of the project
cases are described below, followed by a discussion covering the development of a specification
of the lessons from the cases for governance of the document; the second was signed early in the
project/user relationship. development activity. Good-Q was completed on
schedule, relative to the plan presented in the
second project authorization, and two months ahead
THE CASES of original estimates. Similarly, project costs were
only slightly over the authorized budget (+3%) and
The Second Rated Project -- Good-Q 17% below original estimates.
This highly rated project seemed at first to be a Of the fourteen projects examined in this research,
straightforward example of appropriate use of quasi- this is the only one on which the authorized
market governance in a low uncertainty situation. schedule and budget are shorter and smaller than
Closer examination, however, reveals some inter- the original schedule and budget estimates. On
esting twists. closer examination, however, it is clear that the
definition of "complete" for Good-Q meant that the
According to its Project Closing Report (PCR), "The programs were operational, not that they were being
objective of [Good-Q] was to provide Retail used for business purposes. The following passage
Marketing with an on-line computer system for from the PCR reflects Nancy's argument that the
tracking and reporting expenditures against es- Good-Q project should be regarded as completed:
timated and committed amounts." The new system
replaced an existing manual process. The Good-Q system was signed-off by
Retail Marketing on November 14,
Low Uncertainty. Compared with other projects at 1984. . . . Implementation paperwork was
this site, Good-Q was small and had low technical submitted on November 15, 1984. The
and social complexity. The Good-Q project was start-up database was loaded on November
completed in seven months and cost $165,000. The 20, 1984, using available data....The gradual
new system has one passive link to a financial process of moving programs, JCL, data
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sets, libraries, etc., from test to In this way, governance mechanism and project
production took place during the last characteristics are successfully matched.
week of November. The installation
was completed by November 29, 1984,
and the system run in production on The Third Rated Project -- Good-M
November 30, 1984.
On this challenging project, heavy user involvementHowever, user training was conducted a few provided a foundation for social contracting. But,
months following this date, and business use of the as shown below, the project manager also considers
system did not begin until well into 1985. Ap- some aspects of the quasi-market approach to beparently the day-by-day description of the wind- important to project success.
down of the Good-Q project demonstrates Nancy's
success in convincing MIS and user management The Good-M project modified the company'sthat the project team's responsibility was to get the customer system to support a new multi-million
code running on the computer, and that it was the dollar real-time application, called PMS here, which
user's responsibility to use it. was under development at the same time. The
scope of Good-M included fulfillment of several
During the interview, Nancy contrasted the ef- outstanding enhancement requests, but its drivingfectiveness of SDM/70 for project control with a force was the PMS project. The project author-prototyping methodology, called PDM/80 (PDM/80 ization's return on investment box says, "Not
1984), being evaluated by the department. "PDM/80 applicable -- PMS prerequisite." The project wasdoesn't have rigorous controls. SDM lets you finish funded, along with the PMS project, by a high leveIone step before moving to the next. PDM/80 is steering committee.
fuzzy. SDM much more clearly defines the dif-
ference between phases: She continued, "There has A Difficult Project. The Good-M project lasted
to be that instant in time when you release the twenty months and cost just under $1,000,000; at
system to be in production. PDM/80 misses that." this site, that is a large project. Technical
complexity was very high; PMS was the company'sWhen asked what contributed to the successful first attempt to implement a real-time system.control of progress and the making of tradeoff Social complexity was also high, due in part todecisions on Good-Q, Nancy cited "rigorous applica- heavy interdependence with the PMS project.tion of SDM/70 techniques" and "keeping in very Beyond PMS, two additional groups of users wereclose touch with the team, so we could always tell impacted by the Good-M project (1) I/0 Control,
where we were: In her opinion, a good relation- who gave up responsibility for maintaining the
ship between the project and the user depends on customer database, and (2) people throughout thesatisfactory completion of the formal agreement, company who took on this responsibility. This
and satisfactory completion of the formal agreement group, including people at field offices, regional
rests on close control of the project team. marketing offices, zone offices, refineries, and
headquarters, was represented on Good-M by a set
of "coordinators:
The exploratory model indicates that quasi-market
governance will successfully mitigate small amounts Matrix Governance. The Good-M project had veryof project difficulty. It appears that in this case high user involvement on several fronts. Good-Mthe mitigation occurs in an unexpected way. That project team members met daily with representatives
is, Nancy began with the assumption that quasi- of the main PMS development team and two other
market governance would be used. Then, to the PMS support projects. In effect, Good-M hadextent necessary, she retro-fitted the project to be "users" who were capable of and interested inmanageable under that constraint, including scoping participating in detail design and programming.the work to be done so that it ended with delivery Standards and data definitions were shared, and the
of the programs to a computer. The management of bulk of the planning for testing and installationthe IS department is familiar with Nancy's style and were carried out jointly. A user liaison (from I/0values it, assigning her to manage smaller, less Control) and the coordinators were heavily involved
technically complex projects, in full confidence that in the requirements definition, systems test andthey will be completed on time and within budget. implementation of the new customer database. The
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coordinators were given the opportunity to try to Oscar, the project manager, discussed governance of
"crash" the system for about three weeks, which project/user relationships. In his view, user
provided a healthy measure of exercise for the new involvement can be difficult to obtain for several
system. The user liaison led the training process. reasons. First, as in this case, users may be
geographically dispersed. Second, the most know-
The Good-M project apparently made extensive use ledgeable users have their own jobs to perform.
of social contracting within a framework of a single Third, users may fear automation, or may have had
large project authorization. No project author- bad experiences working with analysts in the past.
ization covered the development of requirements, a So Oscar says that one must work very hard to
violation of local standards. The single project establish trust with the users. On this project, he
authorization, for $1.1 million, was signed after the visited numerous user sites, watched and listened
requirements were completed. Subsequently, during the day, and took people to dinner, listening
however, changes to requirements needed for PMS some more. "You have to know who they are and
were accommodated throughout the project. The how they communicate," he says. He spoke
PCR says, "In September, 1983, the requirements frequently on the phone with users, "but nothing
were frozen." The PCR then goes on to describe a beats one on one."
lengthy series of changes originating from the PMS
project. Finally, it says, "During the final inte- Oscar is motivated by a generalized notion of
gration and acceptance testing phase, changes were investing in future payoffs when he establishes
still being received from the PMS teams." relationships with users. When other analysts are
only gathering requirements information, Oscar is
Good-M's project authorization does not include a "building trust." On this foundation, informal
schedule; of the project authorizations reviewed, agreements can be made easily and quickly accord-
this is the only one without a proposed delivery ing to Oscar. Oscar also stressed the importance of
date. The PCR, however, makes reference to an formal agreements. "Each has its own place," he
"original" plan and a "revised" plan. The PER says, says. "They make up a system of checks and
balances. Things like requirements documents keep
people honest. Without that you'd get so sloppy,
The Programming and Implementation it would be chaos." Overall, in his view, formal
Phase was originally scheduled to be agreements set the limits for the investment, user
completed in April, 1984. However, due to involvement provides an opportunity for mutual
the many uncertainties surrounding the trust, and the trust allows the details of the
new PMS environment and the continuous investment to be worked out informally.
changes requested by both the PMS teams
and on-going business operations, the The Good-M project and Oscar's philosophy support
implementation phase was extended to the model. Oscar achieves success by using SDLC-
July 12,1984. type authorizations and documents for the organiza-
tional legitimacy they provide and as an umbrella
The project manager said that the revised schedule under which he works more informally, relying on
was agreed to by "all parties" just prior to the new personal relationships, mutual trust, and shared
July due date, well after the original April due date. understanding of goals.
This agreement notwithstanding, department
performance reports record Good-M complete as of The Twelfth Rated Project -- Bad-Q
December, 1984, "on time."
This project was relatively difficult, and the
inexperienced project manager hoped that rigorous
Pinpointing the cost performance of Good-M is application of the quasi-market governance tech-
equally difficult. The total costs of the project are niques she had learned would minimize the conse-
reported to be 10% under budget. There is also a quences of that difficulty. Unfortunately, things
note that about 8.6% of the total charges for Good- did not work out. Maintenance costs on this
M are for "PMS support: The PCR also notes that system were high, and the system suffered from
much overtime -- roughly equivalent to the 1096 complexity due to late design changes. The project
underrun -- was needed to meet the schedule. also apparently suffered from bad public relations.
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The objective of the Bad-Q project was to replace a would have handled a design improvement in this
batch operational control system used at the manner.
refineries with an enhanced online/database system.
The project was funded by the headquarters' As a result of a scope change at the end of the
Refining Department, as are all data processing requirements phase (from batch updating to online
systems used at the refineries. For several years updating), the requirements had to be partly redone,
h.eadquarters had been attempting to make the and the first project authorization was officially
administrative processes used at the refineries more overrun. (A more experienced manager might have
uniform. Common computer systems are seen as one included the additional work in the next phase.)
way of achieving this objective. In addition, the Increases to cost and schedule of subsequent phases
business users affected by this system included not required by the increased scope were included on
only the refineries, but also marketing field offices. the second project authorization. In the end,
however, the project was nearly 1096 over author-
Relatively Difficult. The Bad-Q project started in ized budget, with the overrun about equally divided
June, 1981, and took twenty months to complete at between the two halves of the project. Only two
a cost of about $635,000. Relative to other ORM of the fourteen projects officially overran their
projects, Bad-Q is just above average in size. This authorized budgets by more (by about 12% in both
was the first of a series of similar replacements, cases). Little effort was made to hide the overrun.
and thus was a proving ground for several new "I know a lot more now," Jane said, ruefully.
technologies. The project team was relatively
inexperienced, leading to high technical complexity. When asked what went wrong, Jane replied, "This
Social complexity of Bad-Q was also high; not only project didn't get the attention it deserved, from
was the user community large and dispersed, but the refinery, from marketing, from IS." She
implementation of Bad-Q implied changes to contrasted this with her next project, which was
organization structure and jobs at the refineries. over twice the size: "On MMM we had so much
user involvement. It was wonderful. You need
Quasi-Market Governance. In the requirements commitment and energy from the users."
phase, users at all refineries were interviewed,
following SDM guidelines. When the requirements At the end of the project, in Bad-Q's PCR, Jane
were complete, design reviews were held at the made a number of recommendations for future
refineries. User involvement was more intense refinery-based implementations. Some involved the
during implementation. Refinery personnel used the use of tools and techniques, but many others can be
new communications network to participate in the interpreted as a call for larger investments in
system test long distance, so to speak. According establishing matrix governance mechanisms. With
to Jane, the project manager, "The network allowed respect to user involvement she said, "If this type
us to demonstrate our system to users in the of cross-functional effort is to be undertaken in
refineries ....In doing so we were able to give the other projects, it is my recommendation that
users first-hand knowledge of the system operation specifications be developed with heavy user
and obtain feedback from them during our testing involvement from all organizations: And elsewhere,
phase." This involvement was found to be ex- "it is important to train both users and data
tremely useful in finding errors, but provides little processors in order to facilitate [future] refinery
foundation for social contracts. implementations." Generally, she advocates a
longer, fuzzier implementation schedule, with some
burn-in time at the first site, or a "post-implemen-
In the contracting arena, it seems fair to say that tation follow-up" -- a sort of mop-up operation.
Jane, managing her first project, made a sincere These make the delivery date harder to establish
effort to conform to quasi-market expectations for and violate quasi-market principles. Finally, she
project/user governance. Two project authoriza- advocates more involvement by the refinery
tions and one development change request were computing staff throughout development (as opposed
signed for Bad-Q. Bad-Q's was the only develop- to just during the installation of the programs) "in
ment change request signed among the fourteen order to cut travel costs on future projects." That
projects examined in this research. It covered a is, raising the level of expertise of refinery
design improvement suggested by the project team; computer operators on one project could reduce
in the opinion of another manager, only a novice development costs on subsequent projects.
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In terms of the model being examined, it seems document itself. "During programming," said Sara,
likely that the problems on Bad-Q stemmed from the project manager, "the Guru was closeted."
insufficient early user involvement and too much
reliance on quasi-market governance to deal with Relations between Sara and the Guru were difficult.
uncertainty. The model suggests that attempting to Sara is a business analyst, not a technician, and the
govern a difficult project with quasi-market Guru is a "brilliant, private, arrogant genius,"
mechanisms will result in a less than optimal return according to one observer. They did not commun-
on investment, owing to suboptimal tradeoff icate. In talking about how change control was
decisions and increased costs of rework. Evidence handled, Sara commented "After we agreed on a
of both are indicated in this case. change, he just changed the code, or made a note
in the online file of system documentation. I never
saw anything: From her point of view, he was
The Thirteenth Rated Project -- Bad-? secretive. In one outsider's view, she was not
technically strong enough to grasp his designs.
Apparently neither matrix nor quasi-market ap- Sara admitted freely that she had no idea how the
proaches were used on this small and relatively Guru's programs worked.
straightforward project. The outcome, not un-
expectedly, was unsatisfactory. Sara did not make extensive use of formal contract-
ing on Bad-?. Five months after starting work and
The Bad-? project developed an online system to six weeks before the projected implementation, a
maintain and access data common to several crude project authorization for $132,000 was signed. It
oil supply systems. The new system consists of appears that, at that time, this was expected to be
several data tables (containing the common data) the only project authorization for the entire
and a rule database (governing the maintenance of project. However, a few weeks later, when most,
and access to the data). The project was initiated but not all, of the programming was complete, the
and funded by a steering committee of managers in Guru became involved in a dispute with management
the crude oil supply department. Two other over another issue and quit. Two months later
projects under development at the same time were (after the expected implementation date), a
expected to use the Bad-? database. supplementary project authorization for $90,000 was
obtained. It stated "A significant Dortion of this
Relatively Easy. Bad-? was completed in eleven additional work has been reauired due to the
months and cost about $230,000. The project team deDarture of a kev contract analvst at a critical
included the project manager, an independent point in this Dro iect" [underscore in original]. The
contractor with excellent technical skills, known as remainder of the team finished the project within
"the Guru," and two other programmer/analysts. the new schedule and budget.
The project was small, and its technical complexity
was low (particularly in the hands of the Guru), as Because of the delivery delays on Bad-?, one of the
was its social complexity. The principal users of two projects which were supposed to use the
the system were the members of the two teams common database had to build its own files. The
expecting to use the Bad- ? database. Other users second project was scrapped for other reasons.
were those who would maintain the file entries and Some subsequently developed systems use Bad-?, but
rules, but as the files were small and stable, there it was the opinion of one manager that Bad-?
was little impact on the task environment of these served little useful purpose. Very little of the data
users. was common, and the effort involved in adding new
tables to the Bad-? system is roughly equivalent to
putting a table into an application. Maintenance
No Project/User Governance Mechanism. User costs are high.
involvement on this project was very low. The
design of the interfaces between Bad-? and the Sara thinks that the problem on Bad-? was that the
systems expecting to use its database was left Guru tried to build an overly complicated system,
mostly to the Guru, as it was felt that most of the "to try to provide too far out into the future:
constraints were at the Bad-? end of the interface. The Guru's objectives for the system and the
The business users attended a presentation on the company's objectives for the system, in her opinion,
design, but did not review the specification were not in sync.
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Governance of the project/user relationship on Bad- ally useful. As the uncertainty of projects under-
? seems to be characteristic of neither matrix nor taken in MIS departments increases (with the easy
quasi-market approaches. Rather, user apathy projects undertaken by users and information
combined with a suspension of normal project centers or with purchased software), more effective
controls boils down to no governance. Furthermore, mechanisms for managing difficult projects will be
it appears that governance of the user relationship required. The results of this research suggest that
was undermined by an absence of governance within part of the solution is judicious user involvement
the project team. That is, without sufficient and mastery of social contracting techniques.
familiarity with the costs and features of the
system, Sara could not communicate those to her The cases also show how difficult it can be to make
user community, and could not suggest appropriate an intra-organizational development situation
tradeoffs. conform to quasi-market expectations. In only one
case (Good-Q) were costs (in the project authoriza-
A quasi-market approach might have been ap- tion) and features (in requirements documents)
propriate for this project, according to the model controlled in the same organization. In two cases
being tested here. In fact, this seems to have been (Good-M and Bad-?), primary users were within IS,
a situation in which a formal contract with the while contracts were with steering committees. In
Guru, or pure market governance, would have been Good-M and Bad-Q, users were hierarchically,
desirable. geographically and functionally dispersed. In no
case were the future maintainers of the systems
considered "users: Wearing quasi-market blinders,
SUMMARY we see only those users with whom we have formal
contracts, and simply ignore all others. There is no
Examination of the Good-Q and Good-M projects way to take them into account.
confirms that these two cases conform to the
model's predictions. Concerning Bad-Q, over The cases show that IS project managers need to
reliance on quasi-market approaches penalized both master a variety of governance techniques, which
Bad-Q and future refinery projects because design can be matched to a variety of exchange charac-
errors were made and opportunities for investments teristics. The project can be seen as the nexus of
in matrix governance were forgone. Bad-? appears many exchanges, each requiring some kind of
to have suffered from an absence of governance of governance, with users who finance projects, users
the project/user relationship. Without governance, who submit or maintain data, users who access the
cost overruns and specification failures are not data, and also with data processing operators, data
unexpected. control clerks, program or database maintainers, and
IS management. As IS is called upon to build more
While the use of a convenience sample precludes information systems that provide strategic linkage
drawing any conclusions regarding the accuracy of across subunits, the "virtual user" approach will
the model, these cases, taken as a group, offer become increasingly unsatisfactory.
preliminary indications that the model warrants
closer examination. It does appear that governance The mastery of social governance techniques re-
mechanism and project difficulty should be matched quires. first, their legitimation. This research
for effective governance. The appropriateness of motivates that legitimation process. The project
using the two governance mechanisms being managers interviewed for this study all agreed that
evaluated -- quasi-market and matrix -- for dealing social contracting was both useful and necessary,
with low and high project difficulty, respectively, is but none seemed to think it was quite "right."
supported. The consequence of a mismatch Some IS managers dismiss efforts to build trust with
between quasi-market governance and project users as wasteful "schmoozing." By studying the
difficulty is a predictable lack of effectiveness. appropriate role of social contracting, we can learn
to apply these techniques in a controlled, organiza-
Most of the MIS literature emphasizes the design tionally acceptable manner.
improvement potential of user involvement and the
SDLC. But, here we see that both of these are also One important step in the legitimation process is to
tools of governance, that each one has a limited clarify objectives for the project/user relationship.
range of effectiveness, and that neither is univers- This study emphasizes the view that managing that
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relationship means locating and sharing the cost and narrowly defined exchanges should be examined from
feature information needed to manage an investment both the user and IS perspective. The impact of
in computing. Delivery of a particular product, at past and future exchanges on project difficulty
some prespecified cost and schedule, is a reasonable should be specifically addressed in future research.
objective only if the relationship is amenable to Finally, the range of effectiveness of other
quasi-market governance. governance options, such as classical contracting,
should be pursued.
Another important step in the legitimation process
is to distinguish between the costs to estab/ish a
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